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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ACME CRANE RENTAL CO., 
A Partnership, 
Plaintiff -Respondent 
-vs.-
IDEAL CE~1:ENT COMPANY, 
UTAH CRANE & RIGGING, INC. 
Defendant-Appellant 
(And other parties not 
pertinent to the appeal) 
Case No. 
9693 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
ST'A'TEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by Utah Crane and Rigging Co. 
and Ideal Cement Company, defendants below, against 
Acme Crane Rental Co., plaintiff below. 
Plaintiff brought an action to collect from defend-
ants the sum of $2,294.51 being the balance claimed to 
be due for the rental of a crane used for alterations at 
the Ideal Cement plant in February, 1960. During the 
work the rented crane of plaintiff broke down. Plaintiff 
authorized defendant Utah Crane to make the necessary 
repairs, agreeing to pay for same. As a natural conse-
quence of the breakdown, defendant Utah Crane suf-
fered consequential losses including standby for other 
equipment, and premium overtime pay to finish the job 
on schedule. 
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At the conclusion of the job, defendant Utah Crane 
paid plaintiff for such crane rental on a total billing of 
$3,342.90 the sum of $1,~048.39 and withheld the sum of 
$2,294.51 as an offset to compensate it for the costs of 
repair and such other costs as it actually suffered. 
Plaintiff Acme Crane sued for the above · offset 
amount. Defendant Utah Crane defended on the grounds 
of breach of implied warranty, and negligence, ( Tr 12 
to 16,69,70) resulting in a decision by the trial court 
allowing Utah Crane to offset the costs only of part of 
the repairs in the sum of $825.17 giving Utah Crane noth-
ing for its additional and proximate costs flowing di-
rectly from the breakdown. Defendants appeal the de-
cision on grounds that the trial court erred in finding an 
accord and satisfaction, which the court found wiped 
out the breach of warranty; and the court found there 
was no duty in plaintiff to inspect its crane before put-
ting it on the job, and that hence there was no negligence. 
~E"-q_riginal suit was brought against defendant.~ 
Jaae ntah Cement Co., but Utah Crane & Rigging inter-
vened and has assumed the responsibility for defense and 
any final judgment. (Tr. 68) Utah Crane is the principal 
defendant in interest. Defendants claim the court com-
mitted error. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant Utah Crane & Rigging Co., hereinafter 
referred to as Utah Crane, was employed by defendant 
Ideal Cement Co. in early January of 1960, to ma:ke heavy 
alterations at its plant at Devil's Slide, Morgan County, 
Utah. ·The work consisted of removing a very large 80 
ton kiln section from an elevated level, and replacing 
same with a new section. The heavy lifts involved the 
use of three large cranes simultaneously. 'Ctah Crane 
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contacted Acme Crane Rental about two months before 
the job was to start, stating it would need a 60 ton crane. 
(Tr. 176, 75,) 
Lyle Larson, General Manager of Utah Crane, testi-
fied: 
"I told him that we had contracted for a job 
requiring some heavy cranes and asked him if 
he had a big crane that we could get to perform 
this job ... I told him that it would be necessary 
to have two sets of operators because it would 
be an around-the-clock operation. The date had 
been tentatively set at which I told him the date 
and that I would give him as much notice as I 
could as to when the permanent dates had been 
set and we discussed the rates .... we talked about 
replacing a kiln section at Ideal Cement Co. at 
Devil's Slide. I am not sure on the first conver-
sation whether we discussed the weight. I think 
we discussed the length of the boom that we would 
need ... I told him we had to work underneath 
some forty foot trusses and we would need a 
forty foot boom on his crane, an as I remember, 
it was discussed that that was agreeable because 
that was the length of the basic boom section of 
his crane. (Tr. 176, 177) 
For the work, Utah Crane employed one of its own 
cranes, and rented the third machine from Bud Jensen 
rental company. (Tr. 93, 121, 173) 
At the first conversation between Larson and the 
Acme representative, Acme had quoted $32.00 per hour. 
"Well, that had all been arranged at the first time, the 
$32.00 an hour plus the traveling and traveling mileage 
and the overtime for the operators." Tr. 76) 
There was a second conversation between the same 
parties about a week before the machine was delivered 
to the job site. (Tr. 76) Larson asked "if it would be 
available at that time, and I told him it would ... he 
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told me that it would be operated on a 2-1- hour basis ... 
and that we should have the operators available to work 
that basis ... He said it was a RUSH JOB ... it was 
to place a cement kiln up at ~iorgan ... he did state 
that he needed a crane that size, in that capacity for the 
lift ... " ( Tr. 76) 
Utah Crane's Larson testified: 
" ... I again called Paulsen and told him 
that the starting date had been definitely firmed 
up so that we knew when we would need their 
crane ... I asked him if the cables, the operating 
cables and the condition of the crane was good, 
,and he sa;od yes." (Tr. 177) 
Plaintiff admitted in its answer to defendant's coun-
terclaim that "the capacity of the crane" was inquired 
into. (Tr.17). The pre-trial order states the parties stip-
ulated that "plaintiff's crane was a 60 ton crane'' and 
that they further stipulated "that said crane was lifting 
less than its rated capacity.'' (Tr. 27) Acme agreed it 
was never abused nor overloaded. ( Tr. 111, 30 :9; 48 :9) 
The Acme Crane moved in three days before start-
ing. It is important for this court to know to what extent 
Acme understood the nature of the work, the stresses to 
which its machine would be exposed, and the responsi-
bility of all parties to the job. The older Paulsen went 
to the job site ahead of the commencement. Mr. Match, 
Utah Crane's Superintendent testified he showed the 
partner around the project, Paulsen asking: "What are 
you going to do here~" "Well, come into the building and 
I will show you." So him and the other fellow (the oper-
ator) we went into the building and I showed him how 
we were going to take down this old kiln section and 
put up this new one." (Tr. 224) At the conclusion of 
the inspection, Paulsen commented to Match : "All he 
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said . . . is I had a big job and I had better be careful; 
and I assured him that we were going to take every pr~ 
caution." ( Tr. 225) Larson had also explained in the 
earlier negotiations the nature of the job. (T·r. 176) Ex-
hibits 6D and 7D are pictures of the kiln showing its 
large size; Exhibit 4D shows two of the cranes in an 
actual lift. Exhibit 5D shows the type of equipment leased 
by Acme on this job, the red arrows pointing to typical 
outrigger boxes that fractured. 
THE FRAOTURES 
On the second work night Acme's crane began to 
break up. (Tr. 110) By 2:00A.M. of Wednesday, Febru-
ary 17 the entire job shut down. It was discovered that 
the "out-rigger" boxes were breaking up, fracturing. 
These boxes are stabilizers, keeping the crane from tip-
ping, and they are very important to the operation of 
the crane. (1Tr. 98, 111) Because defendants theory of 
the case is bottomed on breach of implied warranty of 
fitness and negligence, it is important to clearly set forth 
the evidence of record, as to what was discovered. Acme's 
crane operator, Starn, testified that on the second night 
at 11:30 P.M.: 
". . . we hoo~ed on to the end of the vessel 
and as we were raising it we heard a popping 
sound and we stopped and at the time I thought -
there are two or three things it could possibly 
be. I thought maybe there was a rock under one 
of the outrigger floats that had cracked or if a 
cable sloughs a little bit it would make the same 
sound but we stopped and checked the crane and 
found nothing." (Tr. 109, 110) 
This operator went off shift within 30 minutes and 
the next shift were Hy Peterson and John Valdez as 
Acme's crew. (Tr. 114) The Acme operator and oiler 
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had control of the Acme crane, subject to orders of 
Utah Crane's foreman. (Tr. 97, 114:) But if an unsafe 
or improvident 1nove is to be made, the crew can refuse 
to make the lift. ( Tr. 97, 115) No improper lifts were 
made. (Tr. 115) The parties stipulated that at no time 
was the crane overloaded. ( Tr. 2'7) 
The Acme operator's description of the breakdown 
was: 
"Well, in my taking over the operation of 
the crane, Dick said she was all yours, and of 
course I assu/me.d that everything was all right 
. . . Then as we proceeded in our wm:k, of course 
in the picking up of the kiln to bring it inside 
of the building there were of course popping 
noises . . . we proceed to look around to see if 
we would locate anything that might be causing 
them, . . . we looked the second time that it was 
found by iron workers that underneath the crane 
where there was signs that the outrigger boxes 
were showing small cracks in them." (Tr. 145, 
146) ... 
Q. Now did you get under and take a look at the 
fracture or break 1 
A. No, I took their word for it. It loo:ked like to 
me they was pretty honest fellows." (Tr. 152) 
Rudy Crowell, the operator of the rented Bud J en-
sen crane, and not connected with the litigation, testi-
fied he was outside the building operating his crane at 
the time of the main break at 2 :00 A.::M. ( Tr. 245) The 
noise was "loud enough to hear clear outside on the 
other end of the kiln, and their crane was inside the 
building. I heard it over my crane motor . . . I went 
and crawled underneath there because I'm always inter-
ested in things like that because I run a crane ... I saw 
cracks in the outrigger housing . . . pretty good sized 
cracks . . . they was just going all which way in front 
and rear." (246) 
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EVIDENCE OF PRIOR RUSTED BREAKS 
AND KNOWLEDGE THEREOF 
The man most responsible for the move, Superin-
tendent Match of Utah Crane, testified that all three 
cranes were lifting, moving the new kiln into the building, 
". . . And during this attempt we heard a 
loud cracking noise ... this was around 2 :00 A.M. 
I stopped everything ... climbed on the rig and 
talked to the operator. I says 'What has hap-
penedf He says 'I don't know.' I says, 'We'd 
better try to find out.' ... This is the first noise 
... We went ahead ... we moved the crane for-
ward . . the boom was clear up ... and that time 
we really heard a noise. It was no popping. It 
was something loud like a cracking noise, like 
a shotgun had gone off. So I says, 'we are going 
to find out what is wrong ... thats all there is to 
it.' So we shut it down, stopped working and 
crawled under the crane ... One of my iron work-
ers ... found there was cracks in the box. I 
crawled under the crane and I also saw the cracks. 
There was a new crack of ... say, eighteen inches 
long, as long as the horizontal top of the outrig-
ger box, and there was also two older cracks at 
each end of the outrigger box." (Tr. 227, 228) 
Q. Do you remember where the cracks occurred 
in the outrigger boxes~ 
A. Yes . . . I looked at the rear side of the front 
outrigger box. On each side of it I found two 
cracks that were rusted, a matter of about 
six or eight inches; and there was a continua-
tion of these cracks which would be new breaks 
going to the top of the outrigger box on both 
sides. Then along the horizontal of the out-
rigger box near the top where the iron was 
bent over, there was a horizontal break and 
a new one . . . The new breaks were bright 
and shiny, and the old breaks were rusted 
. . . The cracks were opened up, I'd say be-
tween a sixteenth and eight of an inch; and 
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you could see on the surface in the cracks 
there was RUST. (Tr. 230) 
Q. What time was the job shut down, the progress 
of the job shut down ... Y 
A. I'd say between 2:00 and 2:30 in the morning, 
Wednesday. ('Tr. 232) 
This witness of long experience with machinery 
testified the rusted cracks were at least two to threP 
weeks old. Tr. 241) 
It is undisputed that there was rust in some of the 
fractures. Not one of plaintiff Acme Crane's men took 
the trouble to look under the crane at the fractures; 
however, Acme's operator admitted he was told at the 
time there was rust found. (Tr. 123A) Lyle Larson in-
spected the fractures: "I saw some of the cracks that 
had a brown substance on them and around them which 
was to me rust which indicated they had been there for 
some time." (178, 179) ... "It appeared to be rust that 
had been there for some time . . . I would say longer 
than two wee:ks." One of the foremen who aided in the 
repair, Whitehead, testified he saw the cracks and rust, 
and after being qualified to express an opinion as to 
the age of the rust, he said: ". . . the rust that I seen 
with the experience I had in the past would have had to 
have been two to three weeks old." (Tr. 256) 
As to whether Acme had knowledge of these prior, 
rusted cracks, or should have known, the oiler of Acme, 
Dale Schmidt, was heard by four of the crew in the hours 
that followed the break to say that the same type of 
sounds had been heard before on a former Acme job. 
Schmidt was on the shift that quit at midnight Tnesday 
and was present when the first cracking or popping 
noises were heard about 11 :30 P.M. (Tr. 283, 284) The 
next day several of the crew were discussing the break, 
and Mr. Match testified: 
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"Q. Did you have any conversation or hear any 
conversation that day between any of the 
employees or operators of Acme and yourself 
or any of your men~ 
A. Yes, I did . . . it was an hour or two after 
the repair of the crane. There was some Ideal 
men and myself and the other operators and 
oilers of the other two cranes and the oiler 
of the Acme crane were standing . . . by his 
crane ... we were talking about the damage 
to the crane . . . Dale Schmidt . . . he said 
they had heard that cracking noise on .a job 
before this one and they didn't find out what 
it was." (Tr. 236) 
Bud Jensen's operator Crowell heard the same ad-
mission testifying : 
" ... Dale Schmidt ... oiler for Acme's crane 
rental . . . We were all standing right there in 
a group, and he said he had heard that previous 
noise before." 
Q. Was there any mention of when or where they 
heard the noise~ 
A. Well, it was, seemed like to me he said it was 
on about a thirty ton pickup or a thirty-five 
... a lift ... what he said that it was furttn!!J 
that outri~gger hou-sing d~dn't break then." (Tr. 
247, 248) 
The same Acme oiler Dale Schmidt was heard by 
Utah Crane's day-shift foreman Whitehead to talk about 
such prior noises. The study of the record will show 
great effort on the part of Acme to minimize the im-
portance of the rust and the prior noises, but at no time 
did Schmidt deny or challenge the prior version of his 
remarks by the four witnesses. He said: ''There were 
noises on that on previous jobs, yes." (Tr. 283) It all 
stands uncontradicted. Here is how Whitehead testified: 
"Q. Did you ever hear a conversation between 
the crane operator or oiler of Acme on the 
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one hand and any of your crew or Bud J en-
sen's crew on the other with respect to what 
had happened~ 
A. Yes . . . on two occasions . . . the first occa-
sion ... it was the morning of the 17th when 
we first came on the job ... we started talk-
ing about the breaks ... Dale, their oiler 
said they had heard these cracks or heard 
the noises ... when was the second occasion Y 
... it was after the crane had been repaired 
and put back to work . . . the discussion 
came up again; and that was mentioned again 
... we were all discussing the breakdown, and 
Dale said again they'd heard these noises but 
could never find the cause ... Roy was asking 
Dale where." (Tr. 257, 258) 
The witness Burt Match for defendants was called, 
and counsel for Acme stipulated this witness would testi-
fy the same as Mr. Crowell had, (Tr. 250) which means 
that four witnesses heard the oiler for Acme state the 
above admissions concerning cracks or popping sounds 
that it will later be argued should have put Acme on 
notice that its crane was not worthy of rental for such 
a large job as at bar. 
Please note that the Acme oiler had said as to the 
former noises they "could never find the cause." (Tr. 
257, line 19 also T·r. 236, line 4) He was also heard to 
say "it was funny that outrigger housing didn't break 
then." (Tr. 248, line 3) 
It must be noted that no careful inspection of the 
crane was made by Acme before it came to the Ideal 
job, notwithstanding the Acme operator and oiler had 
heard the sounds and did not by casual inspection find 
what was wrong. Defendant will thus later argue breach 
of warranty and negligence. 
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REPAIR OF ACME CRANE, DAMAGES 
Upon the fractures being discovered early Wednes-
day morning, the General Manager Larson was called 
to inspect the cracks, ( Tr. 178) whereupon he went im-
mediately to the phone and informed one of the Acme 
partnersByron Paulsen. The trial court concluded that 
as a result of this conversation an ''accord and satisfac-
tion'' resulted, hence we feel the need to clearly show 
the scope of the conversation by both participants. 
Byron Paulsen testified as to what Larson said : 
"Well in essence he said that there were 
cracks in the outrigger boxes in the metal, and 
he wanted to know if they (Utah Crane) should 
go ahead and fix it and if they did, if we would 
be responsible for the cost of it. 
Q. Now by 'the cost of it' what do you mean~ 
A. Of the repairs . . . Well, I said yes because 
I thought it was only prudent to help them 
get the work done. 
Q. And you gave the authorization~ 
A. Yes. 
On cross examination, the same Byron Paulsen 
added: 
". . . the phone rang, it was in the dark of 
night and finally on its ~ncessant ringing, I got 
up and answered it and I didn't really check the 
clock ... 4 to 4 :30 A.M. I would not dispute it ... 
I have no reason ... that there would be a lawsuit 
over it. (Tr. 168) ... Mr. Larson said just simply 
that he wanted to get on with the work ... I know 
he was concerned about getting to work and pro-
ceeding with his job . . . 
Q. Well, something rests in your mind that Mr. 
Larson said 'we have got to get this repair 
job done quick.' Am I right or wrong~ 
A. Yes, that's right." (Tr. 170) 
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• ·I told him that there was cracks in the out-
rigger housings of such a nature that we couldn't 
proceed with the job . . . I a1n sure that in the 
conversation it was brought out that some of them 
was old and some of them were new ... l\lr. Paul-
sen said, 'vVell as you know it is a fairly new 
crew (meaning crane). 1 think we should have 
P&H or some of Cate's people look at it in the 
morning.' I told hi1n that we were under a terrific 
penalty up there of $300 an hour shut-down time 
on the kiln. We had a definite cornmitbnent to 
meet, and I didn't feel that if we were going to 
try to meet this deadline and our committment 
that we had time to wait for people to come in 
... He told me that it was his judgment or I 
can't remember the exact words, but he gave me 
the understanding that we should go ahead and 
repair the crane ... " (Tr. 181) 
Repair of the .Acme crane connnenced immediately. 
It was necessary to locate steel plate on the Ideal Cement 
premises. (Tr. 182, 186) .After the repairs had been 
authorized by Paulsen and before the steel plate arrived, 
it was necessary for Utah Crane's employees to bring 
equipment down from the elevated structures of the kiln, 
and begin to prepare the out-rigger box surfaces for 
repair, and this was done. (Tr. 182, 187) Plaintiff .Acme 
contested the time, expense, and personnel required to 
repair the crane, so it is important to note the detail 
of record. 
Utah Crane's Superintendent Match testified: 
" ... after Mr. Larson got permission to get 
this plate, the plate was brought over and at the 
same time the men were getting welding machines, 
cutting torches, grinders and chipping guns to 
the job. Tr. 232) ... Some of them had to come 
from the top of the kiln . . . Actual repair work 
began . . . 4 to 4 :30 in the morning . . . I told 
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Roundy (foreman) to get all six men on the floor 
and to immediately start to repair this crane be-
cause it was holding us up. We had to get back 
into operation ... There was six men working on 
the crane and the Foreman." ( Tr. 234) 
All agree the job was shut down for 12 hours during 
repair. As a consequence the other cranes and crew were 
idled; overtime at double pay was required to finish 
the job on schedule. The actual costs of the repair are 
stated in Exhibit 2 P in the sum of $665.92 for labor and 
$159.25 for materials as billed, making a total of $825.17 
and this is the amount the trial court accepted in its 
Findings of Fact as an offset. In fact the court could 
do nothing else, for Acme had admitted in the Tetter of 
its counsel, rejected Exhibit 9D that it would be liable 
for that amount. It must be noted that the above figure 
does not include any allowance for the cost of the several 
welding and cutting machines, grinding and chipping 
tools. "The fractures had to be cleaned up, getting the 
slag off and veeing the edges down" etc. ( Tr. 187) All 
this preparatory work required equipment, none of which 
was allowed as to costs. 
The other costs of the shut-down were totally ig-
nored by the trial court and eliminated by its findings 
of an accord and satisfaction. These additional direct 
elements of damage are stated in Exhibit 2 P and in-
clude $638.35 as the cost of the Sunday premium time 
and $830.99 as the cost of the standby of the two other 
cranes for 12 hours, for nothing else could be done dur-
ing the repair. (Tr. 192, 208) It is the combination of 
these two items above in the sum of $1519.34 that con-
stitute the subject of this appeal. 
The balance of the facts will be stated in connec-
tion with the argument to follow. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
AND CONCLUDE THAT ACME SHOULD BE NON-SUITED 
AS A MATT'ER OF LAW. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING NO DUTY WAS 
PROVEN, HENCE NO NEGLIGENCE. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT AN 
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WAS AGREED UPON, 
THEREBY DISCHARGING THE CLAIM OF BREACH OF 
WARRANTY. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO OFF-SET JUDG-
MENTTODEFENDANTFORFULLDAMAGESBYREASON 
OF THE BREACH OF WARRANTY AND NEGLIGENCE. 
ARGUl\iENT 
POINT I 
THE T'RIL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND AND 
CONCLUDE THAT ACME SHOULD BE NON-SUITED AS 
A MATTER OF LAW. 
A search of this record will clearly disclose that 
under no circumstances could it be said that appellant 
Utah Crane was culpable, negligent or under any delict. 
Utah hired the services and equipment of a regular rent-
ing company with years of experience of a 60-ton crane 
with operators, Acme representing the crane to be in 
good condition. (Tr. 177) The Lifts made were all 
stipulated to be under the rated capacity of Acme's crane 
( Tr. 27) and at no time did Utah Crane abuse the crane 
by admission of Acme's operators. (Tr. 49 Int 16) 
The machine broke down under a lift of about 40 
tons, this being but two-thirds of its rated and repre-
sented capacity. WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
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LOSSES SUFFERED BY UTAH CRANE in respect 
to standby time for two idled machines, crew, and Sun-
day double time¥ 
Questions of Burden of Proof, presumptions, infer-
ences are brought into focus by this court in WYATT 
v. BAUGHMAN, 239 P2d 193 involving the respective 
rights, duties and obligations of bailor and bailee. This 
court should bring to bear in the case at bar its own 
standard of who was responsible. This court exhoner-
ated the hanger-bailee in the airplane fire case when 
the bailee showed its own absence of fault, tending to 
prove due care by the bailee. In the Wyatt case this 
court said : '' There was no suggestion made by plaintiff 
(bailors of the planes) either by way of evidence or 
argument, of a source from which negligence might arise, 
upon which the defendant (bailee) did not present some 
competent evidence tending to negative his negligence." 
To the contrary in the case at bar: not only does the 
record show positively that the bailee Utah Crane com-
mitted no fault, but the following affirmatively shows 
some fault on Acme as bailor: 
a. It affirmed the crane was in good condition. 
(That the crane failed under no abuse, and at 
but two-thirds of its capacity, and this under 
the hands and moving control of Acme's oper-
ators. 
b. Notwithstanding the usual groans and noises of 
cranes generally in heavy lifts, the oiler of Acme 
admitted that at a former lift of about 35 tons 
at another location, it was "funny that outrigger 
housing didn't break then." (Tr. 248) It is not 
"funny" at all. It was tragic that he was so care-
less as to not find out what was wrong, or report 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
his inability Tr. 98) so that 1nanagement could 
take the important danger into hand with such 
inspections as might be required. 
c. Acme by its Inanagement and its crew did not 
make inspections at any time of the instrwnents 
by which the crane gets its stability in heavy lifts. 
(Tr. 98, 96, 95, Int. 19 Tr. 31 & 49,) They took 
it for granted everything was all right, because 
they had never had any trouble before with the 
boxes. ( Tr. 93) They too:k great comfort from 
the testimony of Match that he did not carefully 
examine out-rigger boxes; but it was not rele-
vant to Acme's case as to what Match did in 
the absence of such noises as the Acme oiler 
had heard. Had Match heard such unusual noises, 
he would have been on notice too. 
d. Rust on old fractures on the boxes, extending 
from the new breaks, had been on the machine 
for a long enough time to import to any court 
that the cracks were there when the crane came 
to the Ideal job. The rust and cracks were patent 
defects. But even if they were "latent", the 
standard of care required of the law stated by 
the court in RENOLDS v. AMERICAN FOUND-
RY, 239 P2 209 required inspection, and this 
court holds the bailor who fails to inspect before 
use of a chain or machine of a dangerous poten-
tial use, to be liable for the damages occasioned 
by the failure. So does the Restement of Torts, 
No. 392; So does Learned Hand in SHAMROCK 
v. FICHTER STEEL. 155 F2d 69; So do Jus-
tices Crane and Cardoze in HOISTING ENGIXI~ 
SALES v. HART, 142 NE 342. 
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e. Acrne made no exhonerating explanation as to 
why its crane failed, but the failure it admits in 
answer to interrogatory 7. (Tr. 48, interrogatory 
29, 32, 34, 36, 38 Tr. 49 to 51) Acme did say in 
its answers to interrogatories that it "assumes 
that the defects in the outrigger boxes were there 
at the time of the manufacture of the crane." ( T·r. 
50, no. 38) In interrogatory 18 (Tr. 31) as to 
the cause of the fracture, Acme simply said : 
"Plaintiff presumes that the cause of the 
fracturing of the outrigger boxes was defective 
steel in the boxes." (Tr. 49 No. 18) 
Thus Acme not only failed to even try to exculpate 
itself as a matter of fact in the record, hut as a matter 
of law, it also failed. It did not do what the Utah court 
has required of it as even a minimum in the "simple tool" 
doctrine of PETERSON v. ALKEMA, 261 P2d 175, let 
alone in REYNOLDS v. AMERICAN FOUNDRY, sup-
ra. And if the Utah court's decision in WYATT v. 
BAUGHMAN, 239 P2d 193 puts any burden of proof, 
or raises any presumptions against a bailor, after the 
bailee has clearly established that it was without fault, 
then as a matter of Utah law, Acme as bailor has failed 
to rebut a clear presumption of negligence, prudence, 
duty, and due care that by all the cases on implied war-
ranty subject it to. The trial court failed to see the real 
questions of law to be applied to facts that were never 
really in dispute. Respondent Acme failed utterly to 
prove that appellant Utah Crane owed it anything! The 
plaintiff-respondent should have been non-suited. This 
court should render such a judgment, for respondent 
proved nothing! 
It is clear in the record that there is no dispute of 
any relevant, material fact. No witness of Acme dis-
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puted a material fact stated by Utah Crane. Acme under-
took to shake defendant's witnesses on cross examina-
tion only, but Ae1ne was in a position to bring forward 
·witnesses who might have neutralized or changed the 
testimony of Utah, but Acme did not do this. Hence we 
can say that no material fact was disputed. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING NO DUTY WAS 
PROVEN, HENCE NO NEGLIGENCE. 
Defendant pleaded in its counterclaim the two 
defenses of negligence and breach of implied warranty, 
(Tr. 15, 70) and the case was tried on both theories. At 
the trial there were attempts made to preclude defendant 
from claiming breach of warranty. The court took that 
question under advisement, and its conclusions rested 
the case on both theories. The court held that defendant 
proved no duty on the part of plaintiff in respect to the 
condition of the outrigger boxes and consequently found 
no negligence. In this the court clearly erred. 
It was clearly negligent for plaintiff to bail the 
60 ton Acme-crew-operated crane for heavy dangerous 
lifts without making an inspection. It admitted repeat-
edly it did not take any such precautions. ( Tr. 95, 96, 
107, 113, 147, 165, Int. 19, pages 31 and 49 of T'r.) 
Yet it knew as much as 80 ton lifts were to be made 
between the three cranes concurrently. Had any one of 
the cranes failed during a critical lift, many men could 
have been killed, and tremendously expensive equipment 
at the Ideal plant could have been demolished. The worst 
did not happen because of the prudence of Utah's Match 
who was sensitive to the evidences and sounds of weak-
ness. (Tr. 227) 
The evidence of Acme's duty is replete in the record, 
(Tr. 96, 106, 107, 133, 135, 145, 150, 165, 167) but even 
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if it were not proven as a fact, it clearly exists as a 
matter of law, and so has since ancient times. The excel-
lent old case of Flttnt & Walling v. Beckett, 1960, 79 NE 
503 discusses the duty arising out of contract : 
''If a defendant may be held liable for the 
neglect of a duty imposed on him, independently 
of any contract, by operation of law, a fortiori 
ought he to be liable where he has come under 
an obligation to use care as the result of an under-
taking founded on a consideration. Where the 
duty has its roots in contract, the undertaking to 
observe due care may be implied from the rela-
tionship, and should it be the fact that a breach 
of the agreement also constitutes such a failure 
to exercise care as amounts to a tort, the plaintiff 
may elect, as the common law authorities have 
it, to sue in case or in assumpsit .... 'One who 
enters on the doing of anything attended with 
risk to the persons or property of others is held 
answerable for the use of a certain measure of 
caution to guard against that risk. To name one 
of the commonest applications, 'those who go 
personally or bring property where they know 
that they or it may come into collision with the 
persons or property of others have by law a duty 
cast upon them to use reasonable care and skill 
to avoid such collision.' In some cases this ground 
of liability may coexist with a liability on con-
tract toward the same person and arising ( as 
regards the breach) out of the same facts .... 
'In every situation where a man undertakes to 
act or to pursue a particular course he is under 
an implied legal obligation or duty to act with 
reasonable care, to the end that the person or 
property of others may not be injured by any 
force which he sets in operation or by any agent 
for which he is responsible. If he fails to exercise 
the degree of caution which the law requires in 
a particular situation, he is held liable for any 
damage that results to another just as if he had 
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bound hin1self by an obligatory promise to exer-
cise the required degree of care .... If there had 
been any remedial necessity for so declaring, it 
could obviously have been said without violence 
to principle that 1nen who undertake to act are 
subject to a fictitious or implied promise to act 
with due care." 
In this interesting old but currently eitP<l emw, there 
is also treated the possible tardy claim of plaintiff that 
defendant was contributorily negligent. Defendant was 
under no obligation to make inspection of the Acme GO 
ton crane, the latter being under the control and main-
tenance of Acme operators exclusively. (Tr. 11+ :23A, 
97) 
The above Flint case was cited by the 7th Circuit 
recently in Shuttleworth v. Crown Can, 165 F2d 974 in 
the following: 
"True, the lease entered into by the parties 
provided that defendant should not be liable for 
any damage to plaintiff's property that might be 
caused by the use of, or by reason of any defects 
in the machine, nevertheless, it owed plaintiff the 
duty of exercising due care in furnishing the 
machine'' then citing said case. (Lease of Canning 
machine) 
The unimportance of bailor's negligence in a bale-
ment case is well pointed up in the more recent decision 
by Learned Hand in Shamrock Towing v. Fichter Steel, 
155 F2 69 where a crane collapsed, underloaded as to 
its capacity, damaging a boat and the cargo. The liability 
was fully imposed on the bailor on the well established 
doctrine of breach of implied warranty, not negligence. 
In reading this case, let it be remembered that Acme 
supplied a 60 ton-rated crane that at the time of fracture 
was lifting but 40 ton, and that at a 35 ton lift at another 
location prior, there had been heard dangerous cracking 
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sounds not reported to management by the crew nor 
investigated. We believe defendant well proved a neg-
ligence case, but primary proof and law aims at breach 
of warranty, clearly established here by principles in 
the Shamrock case supra. 
The same effect are two Utah cases: 
Peterson v. Alkema, 261 P2 175, 1953 
Reynolds v. American Founday, 239 P2 209, 1952 
Finally: when one of the partners looked over the 
job ahead of starting, remembering his warning to Utah's 
superintendent. (Tr. 225) So deeply was the court im-
pressed with the presence of this testimony that he shut 
off defendant for further establishing knowledge of the 
job and its risks that it said: ''Paulsen Sr. was on the 
job. He looked it over and said, 'It's a dangerous job; 
be careful.'" (Tr. 2-1:9) The court later forgot any stand-
ard of care, duty, on plaintiff. But in every particular, 
defendant's Match was careful. It was plaintiff that had 
not been, and was not ! 
The trial court's conclusion there was no duty was 
"clearly erroneous" and must be reversed. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT AN 
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WAS AGREED UPON, 
THEREBY DISCHARGING THE CLAIM OF BREACH OF 
WARRANTY. 
Conclusion of Law number 2 says: 
''The plaintiff and defendant ... entered into 
a new agreement on February 17, 1960, when the 
Utah Crane stopped the use of the said crane 
because of the discovery of cracks in the out-
rigger boxes, and under said new agreement the 
parties agreed that plaintiff would pay for actual 
costs of repair .... That the making of the new 
agreement resulted im .an accord and satisfaction 
between the parties settling and discharging all 
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existing claims against each other including the 
claiin of breach of warranty .... " (Tr. 56) 
There is no basis in the record to substantiate the 
above conclusion. It is "clearly erroneous.'' The idea 
of an accord and satisfaction was never pleaded by the 
plaintiff as required by Rule S.c and it was lll'\'Pr sug-
gested by plaintiff at the trial. It is the fig1nent of 
i1nagination of the trial court. It is the wrong way 
out. The real vice in the above conclusion is that it is 
aimed at taking from Utah Crane the $1,569.34 of dam-
ages it actually suffered because of its costs and expenses 
while the repair was going on and immediately after. 
There is no basis in fact for such a conclusion. We will 
show that the law requires fair evidence of intent by 
l~ tah Crane for such a waiver of rights to be employed 
against it. It is a matter of contract, express or implied 
in law. There are neither. 
To approach this question, there must be established 
first an implied warranty of fitness of the Acme crane, 
and in the face of such a warranty, the breach thereof, 
plus the waiver by Utah Crane of a claim for ~meh 
breach. There was clearly an implied warranty; there 
was the breach thereof, and there was no waiver. 
1. 
T·HERE WAS AN IMPLIED WARRANTY 
OF FITNESS 
When the General J\,Ianager of Utah Crane nego-
tiated for the crane far ahead of need, he specifically 
asked Acme the condition of the machine and was told 
it was in good operating condition. (Tr. 177) This was 
an express warranty. Plaintiff at the trial never dis-
puted this express warranty and in fact affirmed it: 
"It was in good condition ... we hadn't had any trouble 
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with it." (1Tr. 93) Under the evidence, it is clear that 
Acme mis-represented it under doctrines of knowledge 
imputedand respondeat superior. 
There is not the slightest question in the record 
but that the crane broke down. There is much evidence 
to show that it was not in a good, operable condition 
when it came to the job. But on the question of breach 
of warranty its prior condition is not important. Sham-
rock Towing v. Fitchter Steel, 155 F2 69. In Eastern 
Motor Express v. M aschmeljer, 247 F2d 826, the 2nd 
Circuit being affirmed by a refusal of the U. S. Supreme 
Court to grant certiorari, post, it is clearly laid down 
as the rule that ''the duty of the defendant, as bailor-
warrantor is .absolute." 
One of the leading cases on the subject is Hoisting 
Engine Bales v. Hart, 237 NY 30, 142 NE 342, annotated 
in 31 ALR 536. This strong court unanimously accepted 
the able opinion of Judge Crane. There the plaintiff 
leased a traveling crane to defendant for use in digging 
and laying pipe. 
"Mter the defendant had installed the trav-
eler and hoist, it broke down completely and failed 
to do the work for which it was hired. Defendant 
had a subcontract ... in New Jersey to excavate 
a trench and lay 10 miles of water pipe. The 
pipes were of steel, 30 ft. long and 72 in. in 
diameter and weighed about 4~ tons each. With 
the derrick defendant intended to operate an 
orange-p€el bucket to do the digging and also 
intended to use the same machine to put the 
pipe in the trench. The hoist could not be oper-
ated as it was designed to work, and the boom 
broke when attempting to lift one of the pipes. 
That the machinery was unfit for the purpose for 
which it was hired has been determined by the 
jury and the unanimous affirmance of its verdict 
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by the appellate division concludes us from exam-
ining the question. . . . '' 
In the case at bar, there can be no question that 
the court has found the 1nachine broke down and was 
not fit for its use, because the trial court awarded the 
immediate costs of labor and part of the materials used 
in repair. Plaintiff admitted the machine broke down 
and needed the repair, and it specifically authorized 
Utah Crane to repair it, and go on with the job. (Tr. 
48, Nos. 8 and 10) Under no theory we can see is this 
appeallate court precluded from review of the question 
of warranty, the breach thereof, and the damages result-
ant. Further in the Hoisting case, supra: 
"The defendant having returned the traveler 
and hoist, this action was commenced to recover 
the rental reserved in the lease. The defendant 
counterclaimed by setting up a breach of warranty 
and demanding the damages sustained in con-
sequence thereof. From a judgment recovered by 
the defendant (the person in a like position to 
Utah Crane here) the plaintiff has appealed, pre-
senting what it claims to have been errors in the 
admission of evidence to vary the terms of the 
writing as given above." 
The application of the law to the case at bar does 
not involve questions of admissability; but in the dis-
cussion, the New York court lays down the law of war-
ranty in bailments, clearly pertinent to the case before 
this court. 
"This case was not tried on the theory of an 
express warranty so let us proceed to consider 
the implied warranty, if any. If there be an im-
plied warranty in the hiring of the machinery for 
a special purpose, that it is and will be fit for 
such use, or at least, will work, then the warranty 
may be proved or implied even though the hiring 
was by written agreement, containing no war-
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ranty. 'All implied warranties, therefore, from 
their nature, may attach to a written as well as 
an unwritten contract of sale. (case) There is 
an implied warranty in manufactured goods sold 
by the maker that they are free from any latent 
defect growing out of the process ... (cases) That 
the sale of any of these things was in writing, 
expressing no warranty, would not prevent the 
warranty by implication from attaching. By anal-
ogy there is an 1-mplied warranty in the hir1-ng or 
bailment of certain kinds of property. In the hir-
ing of a horse there is an implied warranty that 
he is fit for the purpose for which he is taken .. . 
in hiring a carriage that it will not fall apart .. . 
(cases) Shipowners agreeing to furnish the nec-
essary cranes, chains and gearing to a stevedore 
to discharge a cargo impliedly warrant that the 
chains are so far sound as to be sufficient for 
the work intended . . . cases . . . When a stable 
keeper let a horse, knowing that it was to be 
used to take a family to a funeral, he was liable 
for an injury caused by the unsuitableness of 
the horse for the purpose for which it was 
hired .... 
"In Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 1 No. 
1117 we find this : 'The owner of a chattel which 
he lets out for hire is under obligation to asertain 
that the chattel so let out by him is reasonably fit 
and suitable for the purpose for which it is ex-
pressly let out, or for which, from its character, 
he must be aware it is intended to be used; his 
delivery of it to the hirer amounts to an IM-
PLIED WARRANT THA'T ·THE CHAT'TEL IS, 
IN FACT, AS FIT AND SUIT'ABLE FOR 
TH.AT PURPOSE AS REASONABLE CARE 
AND SKILL CAN MAKE I'T.' 
"'This is the rule to be applied to the facts 
of this case. The plaintiff owned a traveler with 
a hoist for digging and lifting work. It hired it to 
the defendant to do such work on his contract 
in Singac, New Jersey. There was an implied 
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warranty that the thing would work as it was 
supposed to do. Instead of this, it broke down, 
came apart, and collapsed with the first heavy 
load. The -defendant does not claim that there 
was a warranty that this machine would do a 
special class of work for which it might or might 
not be adapted; he claims on the usual and cus-
tomary warranty implied in all such hiring that 
the machine will work, will go, will do the thing 
for which it was built, the class of work which 
its nature indicates it was intended to per-
form .... Judgment affirmed." (in favor of the 
defendant-bailee) 
The annotation following the above case at 31 ALR 
540 shows that it in:riunciates a well settled doctrine, and 
should be applied to the facts of the case at bar. The 
annotation is brought down to date in 68 ALR 2d 854. 
An important element of the case· and doctrine 
rests on the reasonable knowledge of the bailor of the 
intended use by the bailee. The !ecord is cle~r that Lar-
son advised Acme at the original contract, two months 
before the delivery, of the nature of the use ·to which 
the crane would be put oil the job; (Tr. 176, 177) an<I 
one of the partners was actually shown at the plant 
what was to be done three days before commencement. 
After looking it over, the Acme partner said it was a 
big job, and to be careful. (Tr. 225) The court was so 
aware of this knowledge that he cut off a witness's 
testimony as cumulative (Tr. 249) and Acme never dis-
puted the point. The doctrine of the New York case fits 
like an excellent glove over an important hand! 
2 
THERE WAS A BREACH OF THE 
IMPLIED WARRANTY 
The New York court quotes the old Halsbury Laws 
of England to the effect that "The owner of a chattel 
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which he lets out for hire is under obligation to ascertain 
that the chattel so let out is reasonably fit and suitabl~ . 
. . . " In the case at bar, Acme let the crane out for 
hire for a particular use at the profitable rate of $32.00 
per hour, 24 hours per day; and for the week's work, 
it billed Utah Crane $3,342.90, none of which defendant 
contested; it preserved only it's right of offset for its 
losses incident to the unworthiness of the machine let! 
Was the Acme crane "reasonably fit and suitable" 
when it entered the job~ It is clear that it was not I 
The trial cour wholly ignored in its findings the entire 
subject of the old, rusted, pre-existing cracks. The sub-
ject of the rusted fractures is pertinent to defendant's 
theory of breach of warranty as well as to negligence, 
under the widely established and followed breach of 
warranty doctrine. No where did Acme claim there 
was no rust. Their own people paid no attention to the 
fractures, old or new. (Tr. 100, 107 ,113, 147, 150, 152, 
153) Match described the rust he found with detail. 
( Tr. 230, 2·40, 241) One of the defendant's repairing 
foremen, Whitehead had to grin~ and chip out the rust 
from the fractures in order to close them with metal 
and weld the new plates over the breaks. (Tr. 253, 254, 
258) The operator of Acme's crane, charged with the 
responsibility for its condition and care, admitted he 
did not get under and look at the breaks, having no 
curiosity. He simply said: "No, I felt they (Utah Crane) 
knew what they were talking about, and if they said 
there were cracks there and breaks there, the thing 
was then to get it fixed." (Tr. 153) 
This same. careless operator had . taken control of 
the crane 30 minutes or less after the first popping or 
cracking noises had been heard by the former shift. (Tr. 
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145) No warning was passed to him by the two Acme 
men going off, and he testified, '• I assumed that every-
thing was all right.'' There wPre the first sotmds of 
his shift; they "proceeded to look around to ~PP if we 
could locate anything that 1night be causing them," the 
sounds ..... we never found any the first time. We 
looked the second time that it was found by iron workers 
(employees of Utah Crane) that underneath the crane 
where there was signs that the outrigger boxes were 
showing small cracks in them." (Tr. 146) The Utah 
superintendent described one crack alone as being 18 
inches long! From the moment of the complete break-
down back for many days or weeks, this lack of interest 
in the crane is clearly evident. Please note that when 
Bud Crane operator heard the noise, he climbed under 
the Acme rig and looked, for, as he said, "I'm always 
interested in things like that because I run a crane." 
(Tr. 246) Here as elsewhere is evidence of duty the court 
said had not been shown ! 
DUTY 
Let us examine the record to see the duties and 
powers of the Acme crane operator and oiler, and then 
measure their performance: The partner P. H. Paulsen 
with whom the first arrangements of bailment were 
made and who represented the crane to be in good 
operating condition, said of the oiler and operator of 
his crane as to whether they would know more about 
the condition of the outrigger boxes : ''Sure they would 
because they are operating it all the time ... of course 
when they are actually operating on the job, why they're 
supposed to be reasonably sure it is in a good operatmg 
condition . . . they have really got the control . . . of 
course they have .... 
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"Q. And if in the course of the operation of that 
crane the operator and the oiler come to 
knowledge that their unit is defective, they 
should report that to you? 
A. That is what they do .... They report it to 
one of us. 
Q. And had your operatives during the period 
we are talking about, ever brought to your 
attention that the crane had any defects there 
in the nature of breaks in the outrigger 
boxes? 
A. No. 
Q. And you made no casual nor careful inspec-
tion of the outrigger boxes before they went 
to this job, did you? 
A. I didn't no . . . 
Q. Are the outrigger boxes important to a big 
lift? 
A. Yes ... highly important." (T·r. 97, 98) 
Whereas the trial court erroneously found "There 
was no proof of a duty to make an inspection of outrigger 
boxes" and coneluded "That plaintiff was not negligent" 
(Tr. 55) the ·well established law holds that the duty is 
always present, that the basic idea back of implied war-
ranty is a duty to bail a fit machine. In Price Bo-iler v. 
Go·ridon, 138 F. Supp. 43 the bailor rented a 25 ton 
crane to lift a smoke stack during which work the 
crane failed. The bailor "did not take over the oper-
ating of the crane and if he had it stiJll would have 
been the .duty of defendant's crane operator Besemer 
knowing that his crane would not lift the 12% ton 
stack, a least with a 100 feet boom, to have advised plain-
tiff's agent. Besemer could not .sit idly by and watch 
the bailee operate his crane in a manner that he knew 
to be negligent or to have his machinery attempt some-
thing that he knew or should have known it could not 
do, particularly when the probable results might be 
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fatal to life or property .... We agree, that there was 
an implied warranty here." The court cites excellent 
authorative cases, including Learned Hand's opinion in 
Shamrock Towmg v. Fichter Steel, 155 F2d 69. The 
Utah trial court committed reversable error in ignoring 
the impact of breach of warranty here. 
Appellant ask this court to refer back to the state-
ment of facts, herein at pages 8, 9 and 10 and examine 
carefully the admissions of the Acme oiler Dale Schmidt 
wherein he never denied his statement to the crew that 
similar noises as happended in connection with the frac-
tures that had been heard before. Yet he failed to report 
this to his superiors. Respondeat superior! The know-
ledge of Dale Schmidt is imputed to the Paulsen partners. 
His failure to look hard enough to find the old fractures 
when they were casually looking before, and at least 
to report to his employer the dangerous sounds he 
admitted to four witnesses he had heard on another 
job or jobs, is not even required in a breach of warranty 
by a bailor, and in a negligence approach is more than 
enough to pin the full responsibility on plaintiff. 
The Utah Court in a unanimous opinion by Justice 
Henroid holds as the law of Utah that an inspection 
must be made. In Reynolds v. Amer.ican Fo'UIIUlry & 
Macht"ne, 239 P2d 209, 121 U. 130, defendant ac-
quired a chain for use in lifting, failing to test or 
inspect; and in a lift of less than the rated capacity 
of the chain, it broke, injuring the plaintiff worker. 
This court made quickly away with the claim that there 
was no duty to inspect! Defendant contracted with 
Silver to make repairs on a transformer, wherein the 
said chain was to be used by Silver in hoisting: 
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''·The record ma:kes it clear that defendant 
supplied Silver with the chain purchased for the 
hoisting of the core, for use by plaintiff and 
others in accomplishing a ·business purpose of 
the defendant, that of effecting emergency repairs 
to its plant. 
"In such event, the authorities uniformily 
call for a higher standard of oare from a supplier 
of chattels than is required of one who furnishes 
the chattels gratuitously arid not for his own 
business purposes. The supplier is required to 
.~mploy reasonable care in discovering any dan-_ 
g·erous character or condition. thereof. The rule 
is ·more ably stated in the Torts Restatement and 
is illustrated in the Comment and examples there-
under. It is .·accepted by many authorities, and 
we sub.scribe to such doctrine. . . . We believe 
that the jury wa·s justified in. resolving the facts, 
including FAILURE TO INSPECT OR TEST 
the chain. -... " · · · 
This court-'s citatio:n and adoption of the rules in 
RESTATEl\fENT OF_ TORTS, (sections 391 and 392) 
is .determjn~tive of this case. Acme had a business inter-
est, and earned $3,342.90 subject to the offset incident 
tq .the failure of the . crane. Knowledge . of the defect, 
rust and the antecedent cause theretofDre known to the 
oiler Schmidt must be. imputed to .Acme. ·Note- the rule 
at page 1066 of vol. 2, Restatement · o£. T·o-rts : 
"A person so supplying goods is required 
not only to give warning of dangers which he 
knows are involved in the use of the article, or 
which, from facts within 4is knowledge, he knows 
are likely to be so involved, but also to subject 
the article to such an INSPECTION as the 
danger of using it in a defective condition makes 
· it reasonable to· require of him. The additional 
DUTY OF INSPECTION thrown upon the per-
son so supplying chattels for a use in which he 
has a business interest ... is analogous to the 
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duty of inspection imposed upon one who permits 
another to come upon his land for his business 
purpose and the absence of such duty where the 
permission is granted for any other reason.'' 
It was reversable error for the trial court to find 
''there was no proof of a duty to make an inspection .... " 
(Tr. 55) and particularly when there was good reason 
to know that something had gone wrong on former jobs. 
When Acme supplied a 60-ton-rated-crane and it failed 
under a 40 ton lift, there is a clear breach of implied 
warranty. When its oiler had heard such sounds on 
a former 35 ton lift .as to cause him to say later that 
"it was funny the outrigger housing didn't break then'' 
(Tr. 248) it is clearly a breach of warranty with notice; 
it is culpable negligence. It could have been a crime 
had someone been killed! 
This court will also be interested in consistency in 
the disposition of the case at bar with Petersen v. Al-
kema, 261 P2d 175, -------- U -------- where the transient 
fruit picker was injured by the falling ladder. This 
court held: 
"Under the simple tool doctrince as recog-
nized in this jurisdiction, the employer retains 
the duty to supply safe appliances for use in his 
regular business." 
Certainly this court cannot ignore the like duty of 
a bailor, in the rental for a high return of a dangerous 
tool like a 120,000 pound-lifting crane! Under the small-
tool doctrine, this court held that the employee is 
"chargeable equally to the employer with knowledge of 
all obvious or readily discoverable defects," and the 
former noises in the outrigger and the intervening rust, 
must be found by this court to constitute a woeful 
breach of duty-warranty or negligence. The trial court 
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"dodged" the standard of high care laid down by this 
court in the Reynolds chain case supra, employing the 
dubious conclusion that Utah Crane had waived and 
compromised its rights to claim the rule. Let this court 
support and dignify its chain rule with excellent facts 
and the total absence of waiver, hereinafter argued. 
See PROOF OF F AC'l,S, Lecture Series, S.L.Co. 
Bar & Utah College of Law, '"Proof of Dangerous Con-
dition, Allen & Romney, Jan. 18, 1961 for pertinent 
treatice. 
THE HYPOrrHETICAL QUESTIONS 
Two hypothetical questions were put and answered 
in the record : 
1. The very operator of the crane at the breakdown, 
Peterson, testified he heard the fracturing noise that 
nia tch and Crowell had said was like a shot gun, ( Tr. 
:2:27, :2-+5) yet he said there was no difference between 
this and the ''usual popping noises in connection with 
the operating of the crane." (Tr. 1-:1-7) He still testified 
on direct that "Then as we proceeded in our work, of 
course in the picking up of the kiln to bring it inside 
of the building there were of cmtrse popping noises ... 
and we proceeded to look around to see if we could 
locate anything that might be causing them ... we never 
found any the first time. \V e looked the second time ... 
there was signs that the outrigger boxes were showing 
small cracks .... " Tr. 145, 146) On direct this witness 
further described the casual nature of his inspections 
thus: 
"Q. Will you tell the court what inspection you 
routinely make on the crane as you go from 
one job to another~ 
A. Well, it is what one can actually see with 
looking it over by just appearance. We don't 
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usually, as far as my crane is concerned, 
get down and get under everything and take 
a lie detector so to spea:k or any kind of a 
n1achine and detect whether there are any 
cracks or not in any part of the metal. 
Q. Do you usually inspect the outrigger boxes Y 
A. No" (Tr. 14-7) 
Now this same witness was asked on cross examination 
the following question, and may it be kept in 1nind that 
when the cracks were found, some of them clearly were 
rusted: 
"Q. I want you to assume that they are cracked, 
and an inspection of the outrigger boxes 
would have revealed that they were cracked. 
'V ould you in ordinary prudence as an oper-
ator of this equipment have taken that equip-
ment onto this jobT 
A. Well, I certainly wouldn't have and if I had 
just informed those that I am working for, 
they wouldn't have allowed it to have gone 
onto the job either. 
Q. Now there wasn't even a casual inspection 
of the outrigger boxes by you as to the boxes 
at any time connected with the Ideal Cement 
job until after the fractures, is that righU 
A. That's right." (Tr. 150) 
How escape the standard of care set by Acme's own 
operative, and the entire management was constructively 
on notice something might be wrong from the oiler who 
made the undenied admission he had heard the same 
type of noises before and told no one. Utah Crane 
should not be caught in such a trap; Acme should not be 
exhonerated from such culpability. 
2. Acme called Andrews an expert witness who was 
president of his crane rental firm, with 16 years' exper-
ience with like machines as broke down. (Tr. 130) At 
the time of shop servicing this expert said on direct: 
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"When they are brought into the yard, shop, why they 
are usually brought in on the floor of the shop and 
greased with a pressure lubricating machine and gone 
over quite thoroughly, but out on the job ... it is the 
oiler's job to watch and check a machine to see that Vt 
is im working order, that there is no loose bolts and get 
under it and grease it and inspect drive lines, etc .... 
We visually look the machine over and the operator 
usually is aware if anything is going wrong or needs 
attention. The man that is operating it would be the 
closest contact with it to know. The management would 
not go out on the machine himself everytime a machine 
goes out of yard and thoroughly inspects it, no. . . . 
The ordinary day-to-day maintenance is performed by 
the operating crew. . . . If the outriggers are extended 
and they are blocked at this time, the pressure would go 
on the outriggers. . .. " ( Tr. 131 to 135) The end of the 
expert's testimony on direct was that he had never had 
an outrigger box fail. 
The above direct examination compelled the defend-
ant to put a hypothetical question to the expert, the 
answer to which turned the entire weight of his testimony 
to the standard of legal care required by the Utah court 
in Reynolds v. American Fo11,ndry, supra and in Hoist-
~ng Engine: Sales v. Hart, supra. The trial court com-
mitted fatal error in failing to give any weight to the 
expert testimony. He ignored it! Keeping in mind the 
New York case-law that the bailor has the "obligation to 
ascertain that the chattel so let is reasonably fit and 
suitable" and of Utah to inspect, and also that the 
operatives of Acme had heard similar noises before, 
and the existence of the old rust, now note the questions 
and answers : 
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··Q. If you had a 1nachine wherein the oiler or 
the operator had heard unusual popping 
noises, would you t")xpect hiin to make a more 
careful inspection of the vehicle than if he 
had not heard such loud popping noises¥ 
A. Yes . . . loud popping noises aren't a real 
co1nmon occurance .... I would want to know 
where it came from. 
Q. And would you expect your operator and 
oiler to bring to your attention what had 
happened? 
A. Yes." 
And after considerable struggle, defendant's counsel was 
allowed to put the hypothetical question and get the 
answer: 
"Q. Assume l\fr. Andrews that )'OU are the owner 
of a crane and you are asked to put the crane 
onto a job, like the Ideal Cement plant, to 
make a lift with two other vehicles of about 
an 80 ton kiln section and you are asked the 
question at the time you agree to send the 
crane to the job as to the condition of the 
equipment, and you understand that it is 
in good condition and you state to the lessee 
that the crane is in good condition and also 
assume that you have not made an inspection 
of the outrigger boxes, and the machine goes 
to the job and in the course of a lift some 
loud popping noises are heard and the job 
is stopped and your operators and riggers 
looked around for a few moments and find 
nothing and then later on, within an hour 
or two or three, the loud popping noises 
happen again, and a careful inspection re-
veals that the outrigger boxes are fractured 
with some fractures being as long as 20 inches 
and that in connection with several of these 
fractures there appears old rust, and further 
take into account that your oiler says 'Well, 
we have heard those noises before on about 
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a 40 ton lift at the Utah Oil Refining Co., 
and I am sure glad that these outrigger boxes 
didn't fracture down there. 
"Now I want you, assuming those facts, 
to state whether in your opinion and exper-
ience that crane is worthy of your allowing 
it to go onto a job of the character that I 
have described 1" (Tr. 140) 
The expert said he had an opinion and the court allowed 
him to say: 
"A. Well, I believe the oiler and operator should 
have reported any undue, unusual noises to 
management when they were heard, anytime 
they were heard and an inspection made to 
find out possibly what was causing them. Any 
crane has a lot of grunts and groans and 
cracks and pops when you are working them, 
but if you are referring to something extra-
ordinary, unusual pop and crack, why I would 
be of the opinion it would have been thorough-
ly ~nvestigate;d to see what was causing it." 
(Tr. 141) 
Acme's operator Starn testified on direct that it 
was not the practice to make a detailed inspection of 
the outrigger boxes .... "I don't know of anyone that 
does. It's ass1trned that the outrigger boxes are sub-
stantial to take what they were designed for, and we 
don't make an inspection of them." (Tr. 113) The oiler 
who heard the noises on the former occasion, and said, 
"It was funny that the outrigger housing didn't break 
then" (Tr. 248) was on notice something was wrong, 
but like the operator, he "assumed" that everything was 
all right. By the standard of Acrne's expert witness, 
and the law laid down in the strong cases cited in this 
brief, the bailor's obligation is clearly breached. The 
warranty of fitness must be applied. It is clear error for 
the court to have failed to make findings thereon. The 
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trial court found a poor way out by fabricating an accord 
and satisfaction having the legal consequence of wiping 
a..way the right of Utah Crane to recover its damages. 
There is no evidence upon which such a legal conclusion 
could have been arrived at. 
Southern Iron & Equip. v. Smith, 165 SW 804, 
264 Mo. 226 
Flint & Walling v. Beckett, 79 NE 503, Ind. 
Shamrock Towing v. Fichter Steel, 155 F2d 69, 
2 CCA 
Eastern Motor Express v. Maschmeijer, 247 F2d 
826, 65 ALR 2d 765, ( Cert. denied by US Sup. 
Ct., 355 US 959, 2 L ed 2d 534) 
The trial court committed reversable error in find-
ing no duty was proven, as is evident from the im-
mediately above cited Eastern 1\fotor case: The bailor 
had delivered barrels of caustic material to bailee for 
transportation during which movement the containers 
leaked creating damage. In suit by the bailee-carrier for 
recovery of the damages the 2nd Circuit said: 
"Under the common law, a bailor impliedly 
warrants that the goods are fit for the use for 
which the bailment is made at least against latent 
unfitness .... Thus a shipper in delivering goods 
for shipment impliedly warrants that the con-
tainers, if not patently inadequate, are fit for 
the contemplated shipment .... In this case the 
undisputed facts imperatively required a finding 
that the defendant had breached an implied war-
ranty existing under the common law as recog-
nized by the Packing Rule. As a defense to the 
plaintiff's claim of breached warranty, the degree 
of care exercised by the defendant is irrelevant, 
for, with exceptions not pertinent here, the DUTY 
OF THE DEFENDANT AS BAILOR-WAR-
RANTOR IS ABSOLUTE." 
Please note that the United States Supreme Court 
denied certiorari, supra, and by so doing, established 
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as the law of the case at bar an ABSOLUTE LIABIL-
ITY. The Utah court should retain its rule of the 
Reynolds case, and articulate it clearly here joining 
with the great authorities of the nation. 
The effect of the trial court's findings is to en-
large the liability of Utah Crane, requiring it to assume 
all of the standby costs of the two other cranes, crews, 
and the premium Sunday overtime, all of which was 
occasioned by the breach of warranty of the 60 ton crane 
of Acme. The 2nd Circuit said this should never be 
done to the bailee except under express or fairly implied 
agreement, the latter being clearly absent this record! 
Mu,lvaney v. K'lng Pa'lnt, 256 F. 612 cited in the East-
ern Motor Express case supra. 
The Idaho court recognizes the doctrines of implied 
warranty here claimed to be dtpposite: 
Thompson Lumber v. Cozier Container Corp. 333 
p 2d 1004 
Anticipating that Acme-respondant may urge that 
Utah-appellant selected the specific crane, and must be 
charged with taking the specific machine in its then 
poor condition, the record will not support such a claim. 
At pages 176, 177 Larson said: ''I told him that we had 
contracted for a job requiring some heavy cranes and 
asked him if he had a big crane that we could get to 
perform this job." Acme's partner testified ... "he did 
state that he needed a crane that size, in that capacity 
for the lift that he had up there." (Tr. 76) " ... the only 
machine he asked about was the sixty ton machine. He 
said he had to have that size crane for that lift up there. 
(Tr. 78) The machine was never in the "possession" of 
Utah Crane but was under the operative conrol of Acme's 
operator and oiler, subject to instruction as to lifts 
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only by Utah. (Tr. 97) Larson testified he expressly 
asked Paulsen if the crane was in good eondition in 
connection with the expressed in tended use and was 
told it was. (Tr. 93, 177) Paulsen could not remember 
whether such a question was asked, but he said at the 
trial: "It was in good condition." (Tr. 93) If Acme 
shall herein undertake to come under any rule that 
defendant selected the specific crane (which we dispute, 
and the above will disprove), then under well known 
doctrines, the express warranty of Acme that the machine 
was in good condition negates any responsibility for 
such selection. I-Iad Paulsen said the crane was not 
in good condition, it is unthinkable that Larson would 
have taken jt notwithstanding. Larson relied on the 
representation. Caveat emptor will never be employed 
in the face of such specific inquiry of fitness, undisputed. 
Builder's Brick v. Walsh Transp. 17 4 NYS 690 
3 
THERE WAS NO WAIVER OF THE 
IMPLIED WARRANTY 
Acme had committed a breach of implied warranty 
in sending a crane to the job that was defective, not 
fit for the known, intended service. It also well knew 
that the job for the cement company was on rush, an 
"around the clock, twenty-four hours" employment. 
Whether it knew there was a potential penalty attached 
for failure to complete the schedule is disputed by Acme; 
but be that as it may, when the crane had broken down, 
it was apparent to the litigants that repair must be 
accomplished at once. In the telephone call between 
Larson and Paulsen, no conditions were stated except 
that if Larson fixed the crane Acme would pay ''the 
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cost of it" ... meaning "of the repairs." (Tr. 165, this 
being the version of Acme.) 
The only other testimony concerning this conver-
sation is from Larson, who testified: 
"l\Ir. Paulsen said, 'Well, as you know, it is a fairly 
new crane. (Record says crew, but this is incorrect) I 
think we should have P. and H. or some of Cate's people 
look at it in the n1orning.' I told him that we were 
under a terrific penalty up there of $300.00 an hour 
shut-down time on the kiln. We had a definite commit-
ment to meet, and I didn't feel that if we were going 
to try to meet this deadline and our commitment, that 
we had time to wait for people to come in. 
"Q. What did he tell you to do~ 
A. He told me that it was his judgment or I 
can't remember the exact words, but he gave 
me the understanding that we should go 
ahead and repair the crane." 
Q. And did you do that~ 
A. Yes, sir." (Tr. 181, 182) 
Counsel for Acme suggested no theory of an accord 
and satisfaction at the cmnmencement of the. trial when 
in his opening statement he informed the court: 
" ... The crane was stopped for temporary repairs 
from 4:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on February 17. Acme 
authorized the temporary repairs to be paid to keep 
the job going, but the costs of these repairs is one of 
the issues framed in the pre-trial order." (Tr. 73) It is 
clear the idea of ''accord and satisfaction" came into 
the mind of the trial court after the record was closed. 
Please note the report of the superintendent March 
attached to Exhibit 3D it being a letter to the general 
manager of defendant Utah Crane, which said letter 
and the views of plaintiff as to its accuracy, upon written 
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interrogatories to plaintiff, was admitted in evidence at 
the trial (Tr. 82) The contents of the letter as touching 
upon the phone conversation states : 
"I notified 1ny superior immediately and he 
in turn notified Acme Crane Co. He received 
permission from them to do anything we had to 
do in order to put the crane back in a safe work-
ing condition .... " (Fourth paragraph) 
The accuracy of this statement was submitted to 
plaintiff in defendant's interrogatory number 50, (Tr. 
34) wherein plaintiff was asked respecting said letter 
to "Please examine the same and state whether the 
srune is an accurate statement of what happened at the 
time of the breakdown. If plaintiff does not agree with 
said statement, please give particulars as to wherein 
the srune is not accurate." 
Byron Paulsen, the same person for plaintiff who 
had the phone conversation with Larson, verified the 
answers to said interrogatories, and he stated in answer 
No. 50: 
"50. The facts set forth in the statement of 
Mr. Match are substantially correct as far as 
plaintiff knows ; Plaintiff was not informed as 
to the arrangement between defendant-intervenor 
and Ideal Cement, that is, to the tight schedule 
and was not advised as to the possibility of exces-
sive back charges for time lost." (Tr. 51) 
Counsel for defendant propounded the followint 
question 51 to Acme defendant: 
''Intervenor contends that about 4 :00 a.m. 
on February 17, 1960, its manager Lyle Larson 
telephoned a partner of plaintiff at Salt Lake 
City from the job site, and explained the break-
down, and that plaintiff's crane operator was 
present at said call. Intervenor further contends 
that the partner of plaintiff so talked with, told 
Lyle Larson : "Go ahead and make the repairs. 
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You are on the job and know what needs to be 
done. We will pay for the costs and delay.'' If 
said contention is not true, please state what was 
said by the plaintiff-partner in connection with 
authorizing said repairs." ( Tr. 34, 35) 
The sa1ne Byron Paulsen for plaintiff answered the 
above as follows: 
"51. Mr. Byron Paulson admits that he 
authorized the repairs and when asked if they 
would pay the costs for the repair of the crane 
only Mr. Paulsen admitted that they would prob-
ably have to, and authorized the temporary re-
pairs. Mr. Paulsen did not agree, at that time 
nor since, to pay for the costs and delay. Author-
ization was limited strictly to the actual costs 
of reasonable temporary repairs." (Tr. 51) 
Note the frequency of the word "authorize." The 
way this testimony all con1es in from all parties negates 
any waiver. It is largely the language of authorize, 
permission, ''we should go ahead and make the repairs," 
and as lastly said above, Acme "would probably have to" 
pay the costs only. None of the parties to the litigation 
ever thought of, or suggested any condition, waiver or 
an accord. It is the fiction of the trial court only, as a 
conclusion, in which there is not the slightest foundation 
in the evidence for support. 
We cmne now to the application of the law of Accord 
and Satsfaction to the above facts. George Hudson v. 
Yonkers FruVt Co., 258 NY 168, 179 NE 373 is well annot-
ated in 80 ALR 1052 wherein the New York court, Justice 
Cardozo writing, gives an excellent treatice on ACCORD 
AND SATISFACTION. In the case at bar we are deal-
ing with an unliqu~dated claim; and it must further be 
noted that Acme had agreed to deliver a crane in good 
condition (Tr. 177) and that the machine had broken 
down early in the job. Time pressure required immediate 
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repair. rtah Crane was under no obligation to repair. 
Acme by phone told Utah's Larson to fix the machine 
and Acme would "pay the eo~t of it'' (Tr. 165). The 
Cardozo opinion says : 
Two forms of accord and 8ati~:d'aet ion of un-
liquidated clai1ns are to be discovered in the 
books. One is where there is a tru(' a.ss('ut to 
the acceptance of a pay1nent in cmnpro1nise of 
a dispute, or in extinguishment of a liability, 
uncertain in amount. (authorities stated) The 
other is where the tender of the payment has been 
coupled with a condition whereby the use of 
the money will be wrongful if the condition is 
ignored. . . . What is said is overridden by 
what is done, and assent is imputed as an infer-
ence of law. (authorities quoted) 
The trial court in the case at bar got to his theory 
of accord and satisfaction by unlawfully imputing it 
as a conclusion of law only. We believe there is no basis 
in the testimony warranting such imputation. Plaintiff 
did not plead accord as required by the Utah Rules, 
and the case was not tried on that theory. 
Justice Cardozo said in the Hudson case supra that 
between those litigants "there had been no dispute be-
tween the parties and there was no assent by the credi-
tor .... '' As testified at the trial, there was no dispute 
between Larson and Paulsen. Judge Cardozo goes on 
''There was not even any compromise." In the case at 
bar, there is not the slightest inference of compromise. 
Note the learned New York decision on this point: 
"A compromise may result where something 
is abated from a demand which exists, if it exits 
at all, for a liquidated sum. A compromise may 
result where a demand, previously unliquidated, 
is fixed at a given figure, for the right is thus 
surrendered to make the figure higher. None of 
these elements of detriment is present in the case 
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at hand. The defendant did not abate a dollar 
from a liquidated claim. It did not surrender 
the opportunity to add to the amount of an un-
liquidated claim. The conclusion is inescapable 
that there was no genuine assent to an accord and 
satisfaction, and that the debt was not discharged 
unless the situation is one in which the law 
IMPUTES assent, irrespective of the state of 
mind accompanying the receipt." 
In the telephone conversation of record, taken from 
either version, Larson (Tr. 181) or Byron Paulsen (Tr. 
165) nothing was abated. Paulsen testified with no ap-
parent abatement matters in anyone's mind, and he ex-
pressly said "I thought it was only prudent to help them 
get the work done ... and gave the authorization." Had 
the parties truly had a discussion by phone concerning 
the full damage possibilities on the breakdown, and 
then Paulsen made an offer which Larson accepted, there 
might be imputed or found an express accord. But the 
parties were not talking the language of compromise, 
and that Larson would be authorized to fix the crane for 
the costs was wholly reasonable under the circumstances 
of that sleepy moment. It was not the responsibility of 
Larson to repair the crane. It must be regarded as a 
courtesy by Larson to Paulsen to do the repair now and 
thus minimize great potential damage by down-time that 
might be imposed by Ideal Cement. Acme suffered no 
detriment. It did less than the law would have required 
it to do at that time. It was Utah Crane that suffered 
the detriment. Acme was under an implied warranty 
in leasing the fully operated machine to keep it operat-
ing, and it should have made the repair or immediately 
supplied another crane. It had no facilities. Acme sug-
gested delay to the next day in order to bring in the 
P & H factory man and a Cate operative with no sug-
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gestion the latter finns would do repair. It was prudent 
for Larson to state the down time penalty Ideal CPHH'nt 
had uttered and to urge im1nediate repairs of which Utah 
Crane were prepare to nmke and Acn1e was not. \Vhat 
did plaintiff give as consideration for such a benefit! 
It gave up nothing but its pruent n1itigative permission 
to allow the quick repair, and received much benefit by 
having Utah Crane do the repair. It being obligated to 
do the job, and too distant to quickly accomplish the 
same, it simply said Hfix it, we will pay the costs", noth-
ing more. 
Are there not two contract situations in this matter 
that must be isolated fro1n each other, and which the 
trial judge has mistakenly merged Y 
1. There was the initial contract for the entire job: 
Acme agreed to supply a crane in good condition, at a 
fixed rate, fully operated with additional overtime pay, 
and to do so on a "rush", round the clock operation. This 
engagement was clearly bilateral, for Larson had to 
know he could have the machine in order to contract with 
Ideal Cement. In law there is implied warranty covering 
the job. 
2. Within the initial contract performance, the break 
occurs, and it becomes necessary and prudent for some-
one to make the. repairs. Is there not an -independent 
unilateral contract now formed, midway along in the 
main contract, a promise by Acme to pay for the repairs 
if such are made by Utah Crane7 Did an isolated con-
tract for repairs merge with the total contract, wiping 
out any duties or rights in respect to the warranted 
crane, or could the main contract exist through the break-
down, with the inside, incidental independent unilateral 
contract for repairs being isolated? 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
47 
We believe the unilateral repair engagement did not 
reach to any modification of the larger bilateral contract 
which embraced the warranty of fitness. The trial court 
seemed to obfuscate the two contracts into an accord 
and satisfaction. Under the doctrines of HUDSON v. 
YONKERS, supra, the evidence does not allow such a 
merger and wiping out of existing contract rights to Utah 
Crane relating to recovery of damages. There was no 
compromise of damages. There was simply the ~tate­
ment by Paulsen that he would pay the cost of fixing, 
and by the offset at the trial, the court made him assume 
those bare costs. How can such a unilateral agreement 
reach further to wipe out the consequential damages over 
and above actual costs of repair~ There was no ''genuine 
assent" to any such accord and satisfaction, as required 
in HUDSON v. YONKERS. To impute a larger scope 
to the interior independent repair agreement does vio-
lence to defendant. Can it be said that Utah Crane ap-
proved any abatement or waiver of its right to recover 
full damages incident to the breakdown~ Did Acme exact 
a condition of Utah Crane that if Acme would pay for 
the actual repair costs it would be relieved from the ad-
ditional damages incident to the break~ The answer in 
the testimony is no! In HUDSON v. YONKERS, the 
isolation of the inside contract is made more plain in 
the following quote: "What was paid had no connection 
with what was disputed and reserved". We would para-
phrase What was agreed to as to repairs had no con-
nection with what was presently not discussed, was in 
law reserved, and was later disputed in the billing period, 
(Ex. 1, 2) and is the real subject of the litigation and 
the appeal. Acme has always admitted they must pay 
for the actual costs of the repairs; they have disputed 
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the offset deductions for the proximate damages that 
flowed directly from the down-time of those repairs, 
discussed herein later. 
The trial judge "constructed, or i1nputed" an a::-~sent 
leading hin1 to the conclusion of law that there was an 
accord. N" ote the following by Cardozo in tlw H l T DHO N 
case: 
"The doctrine of accord and satisfaction by 
force of an assent that is merely constructive or 
imputed assumes as its foundation stone the exist-
ence of a condition lawfully imposed. 
Acme was under obligation to 1nake the repairs. It did 
not impose any condition or waiver on Utah (~ran e. 
Please note the nature of the cross examination of 
Acme's Paulsen as to the intent in mind of Paulsen in 
the phone call: he could not remember that Larson men· 
tioned the $300.00 per hour penalty that Ideal might 
impose; and he said: " ... I do not remember any part 
of the conversation like that. If I had have, I would have 
driven that crane right off the project if I had thought 
he was going to try and put a penalty on to me." ( Tr. 
170) This proves the limited, isolated, independent na-
ture of the discussion. Paulsen further showed he under-
stood the language of compromise, dispute, accord, pen· 
alties, wherein he followed the above by saying: ''If he 
(Larson) had said that, I would have immediately -
I have been in the construction business a long time and 
I would have immediately known what he was getting 
to." (Tr. 170, line 22) 
The question of accord is utterly disposed of, found 
not-existent, in the following final quote from the RUD· 
SON v. YONKERS case: 
"The difficulty remains that nothing in the 
form of the account rendered or in the accompany-
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ing check amounts to the imposition of a con-
dition that the check must be rejected if any item 
of the account is thereafter to be questioned by 
the creditor. All that the account does is to enum-
erate the debits and the credits among which are 
items of commission, and strike a balance. The 
creditor is not informed that the deductions 
claimed by the debtor, the accounting agent, will 
be deemed to be finally approved by the accept-
ance of the check. He is not informed that the 
tender is in settlement of a dispute, for none 
had yet arisen. He is informed of nothing more 
than the readiness of his debtor to account to 
him for money admittedly his own, without the 
suggestion of a purpose to foreclose controversy 
as to the deductions if any are disputed. An 
accord and satisfaction is not so easily estab-
lished. (cases) The debtor must make it clear that 
it is taken in full payment." (Emphasis added) 
Paulsen did not inform Larson that any rights were 
being waived by Utah Crane repairing the crane. Larson 
was not informed that a dispute as to ultimate damage 
was being settled by the authorization to repair. As in 
the HUDSON case, "a dispute had not yet arisen". The 
strongest form of the testimony is out of Paulsen him-
self, the party in whose behalf the trial court creates 
the fiction of the accord, and Paulsen gave the court not 
the slightest basis for such inferences. On appeal the in-
ferences must be in favor of the appellant, and this would 
require the taking of the Paulsen testimony at fac:e value, 
absent any condition that would reach a waiver of im-
portant rights and duties never discussed, and not in 
the mind of the man who said he was familiar with such 
problems. 
The effect of the trial court engrafting an accord 
where none was pleaded, asked for, thought of, nor 
proved, is to "enlarge the liability on the bailee". In 
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~IULYANEY v. KING PAINT, 256 F 612 at 615, the 
Second Circuit said: 
''In determining the scope of the terms of the 
agreeinent, contracts of baihnent should not be 
enlarged beyond their plain meaning to impose 
further liability upon the bailee." 
It is unthinkable for the trial court: to have heard 
Acme represent it would n1ake available a crane in good 
condition for a large, heavy job it understood; fail to 
find the crane was unfit through no fault of Utah Crane; 
hear the bailor ad1nit time without number that no in-
spection was made nor needed; hear that a prior frac-
ture had been present either frmn the time of manu-
facture, or from a prior job when cracking sounds were 
heard sufficient that one of Acme's operatives wondered 
why the outriggers hadn't fractured then, but he couldn't 
find what was wrong, and didn't bother to report it to 
his superior; rust was present in old cracks from which 
new fractures continued the breaks when the only ex-
planation of the rust by Acme was that it could have 
occurred "overnight"; listen to two hypothetical ques-
tions put to Acme's own witnesses that clearly showed 
culpability; listen to the unshaken evidence of the costs 
of the idled two other cranes and crews, and the neces-
sity for Sunday double-time costs due to 12 hours time 
loss during repair in the middle of the job, and deprive 
the blameless bailee of its legitimate damages resulting 
from the breach on the muddled, unproven, unasked non-
existent and illegal conclusion that the whole thing had 
been compromised in an accord and satisfaction! What 
we are saying is that the conclusion is without merit, 
foundation, and is "clearly erroneous", by the standard 
for reversal required historically in this court and in 
SHAMROCK TOWING v. FICHTER STEEL by Judge 
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Hand, supra. 
There was no accord and satisfaction in fact, nor in 
law. When such error is erased from the case, as this 
court should accomplish, there remains clear proof in the 
record of a breach of irnplied warranty of fitness, and 
the only problem left is to properly assess the damages, 
and allow Utah Crane the total off-set. When this is 
done, plaintiff Acme will take nothing, with costs to de-
fendant! 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO OFFSET JUDG-
MENT TO DEFENDANT FOR FULL DAMAGES BY REASON 
OF THE BREACH OF WARRANTY AND NEGLIGENCE. 
In the excellent crane-failure case of HOISTING 
ENGINE SALES v. HART, 237 NY 30, 142 NE 342, 31 
ALR 536, earlier discussed on another question, it is 
clear that the bailee of the unworthy crane not only 
avoided the suit for the rentals, but recovered the dam-
ages sustained "in consequence thereof." 
The Uniform Sales Act, 60-5-7 ( 6) sets the measure: 
"6. The measure of damages for breach of 
warranty is the loss directly and naturally result-
ing in the ordinary course of events from the 
breach of warranty.'' 
The defendant, upon being billed for the job by 
Acme Exhibit 1P), returned to Acme Exhibit 2P pre-
pared by its accountant. The offset of its out-of-pocket 
damages in the sum of $2,294.51 was held back, and de-
fendant remitted $1,048.39 as the difference. (Tr. 264, 
267, 187) The trial court allowed defendant all of its 
12 hour costs for the rigging crew for repair and the 
materials stated at the bottom of Exhibit 2P but denied 
defendant the two items of $638.35 for Premium Costs 
for Sunday Work and $830.99 as the cost of the two idled 
cranes and the labor. 
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STAND-BY COSTS FOR TWO CRANES AND CREW 
The billing of Acme, Exhibit lP on page ~ thereof 
deducts 12 hours from its charges .. while crane was out 
for repairs." The trial court honored the clailn of dt>-
fendant for $665.92 shown on Exhibit 2P which covered 
the same 12 hours of down tin1e. If there 'va8 a breach 
of implied or express warranty, the "loss directly and 
naturally resulting in the ordinary course of events" 
as stated in the Sales Act supra must also include the 
standby time for the two cranes that were idled by the 
fracture, and the costs of the oiler and operator shown 
on Exhibit 2P. ·These men and machines were away from 
home. The machines could be used for no other purpose 
at the time, and were not. (Tr. 192, 193) Defendant paid 
Bud Jensen the rental. ( Tr. 193) The rate of pay for 
the Bud Jensen crane was $27.50 per hour but the bill-
ing for some reason was understated at $25.00 per hour. 
( Tr. 193) For the two idle cranes the total costs and 
damages are the billed amount of $600 which should be 
disallowed plaintiff and credited to defendant as an 
offset. 
The two oilers for each of the idle cranes were paid 
the sum of $102.33 as shown in the offset bill, Exhibit 
2P. The two operators for the idle cranes were actually 
paid the sum of $128.66 ( Tr. 194) The Bud Jensen op-
erator expressly testified he was paid. ( Tr. 248) 
These cost-damages figures totaling $830.99 are 
firmly planted in the record. Acme's counsel did not 
cross examine nor contest them. They are direct, natural 
and proximate losses resulting in the ordinary course 
of the breakdown, and defendant is entitled to offset 
this sum on the record made below. There is not the 
slightest evidence they were waived in an accord or other 
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satisfaction. This court should award judgment offset for 
said $830.99. 
On page 2 of Exhibit 2P, being plaintiff's own bill-
ing to Utah Crane, it deducted its own costs for ''Time 
from 4 A.M. to 4 P.M. Feb. 17, 1960 while crane was 
out for repairs ... in the sum of $410.29". If it cost 
Acme $410.29 for the twelve hours, rightfully subtracted 
from its bill, why in justice make Utah pay for the same 
12 hours it had to pay the crane crews and idle two 
cranes~ Acme offered no reason for the court not to 
offset! 
PREMIUM COSTS FOR SUNDAY WORK 
Exhibit 2P shows defendant refused to pay Acme 
the sum of $638.35, and offset said amount because of 
its added costs for Sunday work that were directly made 
necessary by reason of the 12 hour shut down during re-
pair. This item was heavily treated during the trial. 
Whether or not defendant is entitled to it as such offset 
is a matter of law, not of fact. There is no question about 
the facts: the record clearly shows the 12 hour shut down, 
all admit. 
Utah's general manager fully justified the offset 
by the following: 
"We lost a twelve-hour straight time shift out 
of the middle of this job; and the result was that 
on the end of the job we had to work a twelve-
hour overtime shift to compensate for the one 
we lost." (Tr. 195, 202) 
It is clear in the record that but for the shut down 
the work would have been completed by one shift on 
Sunday, but in order to turn the kiln back to Ideal Cement 
for its brick-work (Tr. 246) on ~londay morning, it was 
necessary to work the crew at double time for a second 
shift on Sunday. Utah Crane did not ask for this double 
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time. It si1nply asked for credit of one-half of its actual 
second shift cost in the sum of $638.35 which was denied 
as an offset. The trial court conunitted error in finding 
this cost was waived in an accord. At the ti1ne Larson 
and Paulsen talked about repair, this cost could not have 
been known or anticipated, hence it could not in all rea-
son and candor been in the minds for compromise. It 
was not waived. It was never compromised. 
At the trial, its incursion was strongly cross-exam-
ined only. It was misunderstood by the trial court even 
to the last. But its justification and allowance as a direct 
damage cannot be overlooked nor denied as a matter of 
law. No evidence was offered that it should not be al-
lowed. 
In elaboration of the record to justify the offset, 
we give the following: The men on the Sunday shifts 
were paid double time by defendant. These costs are 
governed by agreement of necessity with the union. (T:r. 
266) Acme admitted this at page 92 of the record. Acme 
was asked only to assume straight time for the second 
shift. (Tr. 196) Larson testified: "On the shift that we 
lost, we would have had to have paid straight time. We 
were penalized in the amount of this double time or twice 
the amount of money that the men normally receive." 
('Tr. 196) 
The job was scheduled with Ideal Cement to turn 
the kiln back to them on Monday morning at 7 :00. (Tr. 
215, 216, 222) Except for the Wednesday 12 hour delay 
in the outrigger box failure, there were no other factors 
that delayed the schedule, Larson testified in effect. (Tr. 
211) By working the second Sunday shift at double 
cost, defendant was able to return the kiln to Ideal Ce-
ment at the scheduled time of 7 :00 A.M. ~Ionday morn-
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ing. Tr. 217) Had the second shitt not worked on Sunday 
the job could not have been completed. (Tr. 247) Every-
one would then have been involved in much greater dam-
ages against Ideal Cement at the rate of $300.00 per 
hour. ( Tr. 181, 182) 
Had the schedule not been met, and Ideal brought 
an action for $300.00 per hour for excessive down time, 
this court would be dealing with problems met in SHAM-
ROCK TOWING v. FICHTER STEEL, supra, and there 
is little doubt it truly would have cost Acme "a lot of 
money". Defendant mitigated its damages for which it 
should be rewarded, not penalize as the trial court erron-
eously did, and for which it should be reversed. 
The trial court at the end of the Larson testimony 
was not clear on why Sunday overtime had been offset, 
and it interrogated the witness again to clarify. Here is 
the answer, and we submit it is logical, and represents 
a direct, natural, and proximate damage suffered by 
Utah by reason of the fracture: 
"If we hadn't had to stop, a twelve-hour shift 
on Wednesday, we would have been far enough 
along with the critical part of our work so that 
we would have been through with the critical 
portion of it sometime during the day shift on 
Sunday. We wouldn't have been required to go 
in and pull out our temporary bracing, shoring, 
and so on, on an overtime basis after we had the 
kiln aljgned and welded so it could have been 
bricked .... " (Tr. 219) 
Q. And had you not been twelve hours on Wed-
nesday night you would have had the job 
done twelve hours earlier on the Sunday 
shift~ 
A. Yes, sir." (Tr. 219) "The shift we are billing 
for is the night shift. We are only billing 
for one shift on Sunday .... We would have 
been through 12 hours sooner." ( Tr. 220) 
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They were not going to work on Sunday night, but this 
was Inade necessary by the breakdown. The co~t~ of this 
extra premium shift were actually paid, and should be 
borne one-half as the direct, proxin1ate costs of the break-
down. (Tr. 196) There is no other way to virw the dam-
age. Utah Crane was wholly reasonable even though coun-
sel for Acme and the court had difficulty to understand 
what the witness was compelled to offset. This court \vill 
have no difficulty in a study of the record of the Sunday 
premium time offset, and it should certainly be allowed 
as a matter of law as a proper deduction against plain-
tiff. When this is done by this court, plaintiff will take 
nothing! 
CONCLUSION 
This case should be disposed of by this court revers-
ing the trial court, and entering a decision that plaintiff 
failed to prove its case; that defendant's offsets were 
warranted as a matter of law on the record, and defend-
ant will appreciate the vindication of its rights, and of 
the expensive, time-consuming costs involved in the re-
pair, the trial, and of this appeal. 
Respectfully, 
WARWICK C. LAl\iOREAUX 
Attorney for Appellant 
415 South 2nd East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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